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Assignment mechanisms with public preferences and independent types

Orador convidado

Francisco Silva (Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile)




Início27.04.2022 11:00Fim27.04.2022 12:00

Resumo do evento


The literature on delegation considers the problem of an uninformed decision
maker and an informed but biased agent. I extend that analyis to the case
of multiple agents under two assumptions: independent private information and
public preferences. In the optimal mechanism, agents assign points to the various
alternatives, which then get mapped into scores, so that the alternative with the
largest score wins. Each alternative’s score is the sum of points received plus an
extra term that is larger when the agents who have a strong preference for that
alternative assign points to the alternatives they like less.


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